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Abstract
Education is key in explaining growth, as emphasized recently by Krueger
and Lindahl (2001). But for a given level of education, what can explain
the missing growth in developing countries? Corruption, the poor enforce-
ment of property rights, the government share of GDP, the regulations it
imposes might influence the Total Factor Productivity (TFP thereafter) of
a country’s economic system. A number of empirical papers emphasize the
consequences bad institutions have on growth, but few are examining the
link between education, corruption (more generally bad institutions), and
growth. Our model assumes that at low level of GDP per head and high
level of corruption education spending has no impact on growth. The slope
gets positive only at above critical size of corruption. The implications are
tested using the data set of Xavier Sala-i-Martin, Gernot Doppelhofer, and
Ronald I. Miller (2004), which is extended with the aggregate governance
indicators of Kaufman et ali.
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1 Introduction
¿From Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992: MRW thereafter), everybody will agree
that education is key in explaining growth, and that differences in human cap-
ital can explain persistent differences in levels of national incomes between rich
and poor countries. More recently, Krueger and Lindahl (2001) point out that
education is one of the most salient explanatory variable in explaining either
wages or growth. However, the magnitude of the effect of education continues
to be clouded with uncertainty, as argued by Temple (2001). MRW (1992) has
been criticized for having omitted important potentially concurrent explanatory
variables, for having overestimated the true relationships between investment
in education and private return on it, much smaller with micro-data, and for
having selected a bad proxy for investment in human capital. But what omitted
variables could explain the lack of growth in developing countries and the per-
sistence of unequal trajectories, alongside with education? One possible answer
lies in institutions, as defined by North (1990). The government enforcement of
property rights, the government share of GDP, the regulations it imposes are
likely to have an influence on the Total Factor Productivity (TFP thereafter)
of a country’s economic system.
A number of empirical papers emphasize the consequences bad institutions
have on growth: Barro (1997), Hall and Jones (1999) Acemoglu and al. (2001)
amongst others. But few are examining the link between education, corruption
(more generally bad institutions), and growth. There is one interesting excep-
tion: Breton (2004), who argues that the distance of a representative worker
from the maximum production possibility frontier depends upon corruption,
which is itself a product of institutions. In his setting-up, the main ingredients
for growth remain labor, unqualified and qualified, and capital. Bad institu-
tions can push a country away from the best practice. Our growth theory model
proceeds in a slightly different way. It assumes that at low level of GDP per
head and high level of corruption education spending has no impact on growth.
The slope gets positive only at above critical size of corruption. The implica-
tions are tested using the data set of Xavier Sala-i-Martin, Gernot Doppelhofer,
and Ronald I. Miller (2004), which is extended with the aggregate governance
indicators of Kaufman et al.
Several factors might explain the influence of poor institutions on TFP. First
the amount of goods to be produced through a certain combination of factors
can be lower than expected because resources are partially spent for paying
bribes or for compensating defaulting institutions. Another reason is that the
probability of having monopolistic structures might be higher where compe-
tition is hampered by low property rights; but those monopolistic structures
imply that firms can operate far from the efficient frontier and that TFP is
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lower than what it would be with more competition. Third, as documented by
Friedman et al. (2000), corrupt countries have higher underground economies,
implying that output is likely to be underreported, but not labor and invest-
ment. More corrupt countries will report lower TFP for accounting reasons.
If bribery affects investment data, then investment might be overestimated,
which produces a downward bias again TFP. Finally an interesting argument
is formalized in Breton (2004). The share of government spending contribution
to TFP is positive up to a critical level, then it becomes negative. Indeed, the
basic services like enforcing the rule of law, providing necessary infrastructure,
providing education and health, can be produced by a relatively small state;
above this critical level, the private sector is more efficient.
Our argument lies in the impact of corruption, not on TFP, but directly
on the return to education. Empirical evidence exists. It emphasizes the weak
link between expenditure and educational outcomes, like access to schooling
and proportion of the school age population attending. Somehow paradoxically
there is no consistent effect of resources on educational outcomes: ”In the Lee
and Barro (1997) study, for example, the pupil-teacher ratio has a negative and
significant impact on achievement. Using similar data, the Hanushek and Kimko
(2000) study reports a positive but insignificant result, while the Wobmann
(2000) study, using class size as the resource variable, reports a positive and
significant impact. These latter two suggest that larger class sizes are associated
with better achievement and conversely, that the greater the level of resources
available, the poorer the performance” (Samer Al-Samarrai (2002, page 3)).
Using his own data, Samer Al-Samarrai (2002) show that more resources do not
improve the primary gross and net enrolment ratios, nor the primary survival
and completion rates. The missing link between resources and educational
outcomes might have several explanations, including the relevance and quality
of macro data for analyzing the efficiency of education, the effectiveness of
the public expenditure management system, more particularly the budgetary
process (Penrose (1993)), inefficient resources allocation within the education
system (Pritchett and Filmer (1999), difficulty for implementing reforms to
improve quality (Corrales (1999)).
But corruption and its corollary, bad institutions, are key for understanding
the absent link between resources and outcomes. If the waste of the financial
resources get misdirected, because of corruption, then one should not expect
any link between those resources and what they are supposed to produce. Cor-
ruption indeed undermines the provision of health care and education services.
Fighting against it might result in significant gains as measured by decreases
in child and infant mortality rates and primary school dropout rates. ”Coun-
tries with low corruption and high efficiency of government services tend to
have about 26 percentage points fewer student dropouts than countries with
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high corruption and low efficiency of government services”. It is worth notic-
ing that according to the CIET social audit, the percentage of students paying
extra charges for education range from 10 percent to 86 percent. Langseth
and Stapenhurst (1997) report that parents do pay illegal stipends for enrolling
their children in school. Corruption decreases the volume of public services,
distorts the composition of public expenditures and decreases growth (De la
Croix and Delavallade (2006)). It lowers the efficiency of public services by in-
ducing higher dropout rates and low school enrolment (CIET (1999), Cockroft
(1998)), by lowering the quality of public teachers (Chua (1999)). According to
Ritva Reinikka and Jakob Svensson (2005) the newspaper campaign in Uganda
which provides schools and parents with information to monitor local officials’
handling of a large education grant program succeeded in reducing capture and
on increasing enrolment and student learning.
This paper is structured as followed. Section 2 proposes a model where cor-
ruption produces negative externalities and undermines the efficiency of educa-
tion1. Section 3 exposes the data and methodology used to test the implications
of the model, and computes how much growth can be gained from improving
the institutional environment and from reducing corruption. The last section
summarizes.
2 The One Period Model
We first consider the one period model with a developing country which pro-
duces a consumption good using the physical capital and the efficient labor as
inputs. This country has an initial endowment S. We assume that the human
capital of the workers has a positive externality effect on the total productivity.
More precisely, we have
y = hγkα(hN¯)1−α,
where y denotes the output, k the physical capital, h the human capital, N¯ the
number of workers. The term hγ with γ > 0 is the productivity. We assume
0 < α < 1.
The human capital formation is obtained by an education technology Φ. Ex-
plicitly h = Φ
a,bS(S1)h0 defined as follows:
Φ
a,bS(S1) = 1, if S1 ≤ Ŝ, (1)
1This model belongs to the class of models initiated by Shleifer and Vishny (1993) in
the sense that corruption is seen as a negative phenomenon. In contrast, there exists a
class of models that define bribes as a mechanism for overcoming an overly centralized and
extended bureaucracy, red tape, and delays. Corruption is ”efficient-grease”, bribe reflects
an individual’s opportunity cost. As emphasized earlier, this efficient-grease hypothesis runs
counter to empirical studies and surveys.
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Φ
a,bS(S1) = 1 + a(S1 − Ŝ), a > 0, if S1 ≥ Ŝ. (2)
The threshold Ŝ represents the fixed cost due to the corruption in the education
sector. For simplicity, we normalize by putting N¯ = 1 and h0 = 1.
The objective is to maximize the output y = hγkα(hN¯)1−α, under the con-
straints h = Φ
a,bS(S1) and k + S1 = S.
Let θ denotes the share of S between k and S1, i.e. S1 = θS, k = (1− θ)S. It
is easy to see that the problem becomes
max{F
a,bS,γ(θ, S) : θ ∈ [0, 1]}
where F
a,bS,γ(θ, S) = (1− θ)α[Φa,bS(θS)]1+γ−α. Let
G
a,bS,γ(S) = max{Fa,bS,γ(θ, S) : θ ∈ [0, 1]},
Γ
a,bS,γ(S) = argmax{Fa,bS,γ(θ, S) : θ ∈ [0, 1]},
i.e. θ∗ ∈ Γ
a,bS,γ(S) iff Ga,bS,γ(S) = Fa,bS,γ(θ∗, S), and finally,
H
a,bS,γ(S) = Ga,bS,γ(S)Sα the maximal output (3)
We now give some preliminary results.
Lemma 1 If S ≤ Ŝ then the optimal share of S for the human capital θ∗ = 0
(the country does not invest in education).
Proof : Indeed, if S ≤ Ŝ, then for any θ ∈ [0, 1], Φ
a,bS(θS) = 1. Thus
F
a,bS,γ(θ, S) = (1− θ)α and the maximum is reached with θ = 0. This solution
is obviously unique.
Lemma 2 If S is high enough, then θ∗ ∈ Γ
a,bS,γ(S) =⇒ θ∗ > 0 (i.e. the country
will invest in education).
Proof : Take some θ ∈ (0, 1). For S such that θS > Ŝ, then F
a,bS,γ(θ, S) =
(1 − θ)α(1 + a(θS − Ŝ))1+γ−α. Therefore, for S sufficiently large we have
F
a,bS,γ(θ, S) > Fa,bS,γ(0, S) = 1. Hence θ∗ ∈ Γa,bS,γ(S) =⇒ θ∗ > 0 .
We will show that there exists a critical value Sc, i;e, a value with the following
property:
S < Sc =⇒ θ∗ = 0,
and
S > Sc =⇒ θ∗ ∈ (0, 1).
Proposition 1 The critical value Sc exists.
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Proof : Let B = {S ≥ 0 : G
a,bS,γ(S) = Φ(0)1+γ−α = 1}. It is easy to check that
B is compact and non empty(0 and Ŝ belong to B). Let Sc = max{S : S ∈ B}.
We claim that Sc is the critical value.
Let Ŝ < S < Sc. Observe that G
a,bS,γ(S) ≥ 1 for all S. Since Fa,bS,γ(θ, S) ≤
F
a,bS,γ(θ, Sc), we have Ga,bS,γ(S) ≤ Ga,bS,γ(Sc) = 1, hence Ga,bS,γ(S) = 1 and
0 ∈ Γ
a,bS,γ(S). Assume there exists another θ1 ∈ Γa,bS,γ(S). Since Ga,bS,γ(S) =
F
a,bS,γ(θ1, S), θ1 must be greater than bSS (see Lemma 1). Let S < S′ < Sc.
Then we have a contradiction
1 = G
a,bS,γ(S′) ≥ Fa,bS,γ(θ1, S′) > Fa,bS,γ(θ1, S) = Ga,bS,γ(S) = 1.
Thus θ1 = 0. We have shown there exists a unique solution θ∗ which equals 0.
Now consider the case S > Sc. From the very definition of Sc, we have θ∗ > 0.
Obviously, θ∗ < 1 (if not the output equals 0!)
The following proposition shows that the critical value decreases when the
threshold Ŝ decreases or/and if the quality of the education technology mea-
sured by a increases or/and the externality parameter γ increases.
Proposition 2 (a) If Ŝ decreases then Sc decreases
(b) If a increases then Sc decreases.
(c) If γ increases then Sc decreases.
Proof : (a) The function Φ
a,bS increases when Ŝ decreases. That implies, ∀S,
G
a,bS′,γ(S) ≥ Ga,bS,γ(S) if Ŝ′ < Ŝ. If S′c, Sc are the critical values associated
with Ŝ′ and Ŝ, then 1 = G
a,bS′,γ(S′c) = Ga,bS,γ(Sc). Now, if S′c > Sc then we
have a contradiction
1 = G
a,bS′,γ(S′c) ≥ Ga,bS,γ(S′c) > Ga,bS,γ(Sc) = 1.
(b) We have Φ
a,bS(S) ≥ Φa′,bS(S) if a > a′. By the same argument we find that
Sc < S′c if a > a′.
(c) Since F
a,bS,γ increases in γ, Ga,bS,γ also increases in γ. The same argument
as in (a) applies to have: γ increases =⇒ Sc decreases.
Remark 1 Obviously, when Ŝ = 0, then Sc disappears. The country always
invest in education.
3 Corruption in Education and Economic Growth
We will now explore whether we may have growth in presence of corruption in
the education sector. For this, we consider an intertemporal optimal growth
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model with a representative consumer. She has a utility function given by the
quantity
∑+∞
t=0 β
tu(ct) where ct is her consumption at date t. At each period t,
she saves St+1 to invest, for the next period t+ 1, in physical capital kt+1 and
in expenditures S1t+1 for the human capital. The education technology is given
by a function Φ (from now on, we will drop the superscripts in the function
Φ, F,G,H...) defined by relations (1), (2), (3). Formally, we want to solve
max
+∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct), with 0 < β < 1,
under the constraints
for any period t, ct + St+1 ≤ hγt kαt (ht)1−α,
kt + S1t = St; ht = Φ(S
1
t )
and S0 > 0 is given.
This problem actually is equivalent to
max
+∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct)
under the constraints
for any period t, ct + St+1 ≤ H(St) and S0 > 0 is given .
The function H is defined by relation (3).
For the remaining of the paper we will assume u strictly concave, u′(0) = +∞.
Let Ss be defined by α(Ss)α−1 = 1β . We have the following proposition.
Proposition 3 (a) Assume Sc > Ss. Then if S0 < Sc then the optimal path
{S∗t }t=0,...,+∞ converges to Ss and the country will never invest in education.
(b) Assume Sc < Ss. Then the optimal path {S∗t } is increasing and there
exists some T such that for any t ≥ T the country will invest in education.
(c) Assume Sc < Ss and γ > α. Then, when a is high enough (good quality
of education technology), the optimal {S∗t } will converge to +∞ (the economy
grows without bound).
(d) Let a be fixed. Assume Sc < Ss and γ > α. Then when γ is high enough,
the optimal {S∗t } will converge to +∞. In other words, even in presence of
corruption, the country takes off if the externality effect of the human capital is
high.
Proof : (a) For S ≤ Sc we have H(s) = Sα. In this case, if S0 < Sc, the
optimal path will converge to the steady state Ss (see Le Van and Dana, 2005).
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(b) Since when S < Sc, H(S) = Sα, the optimal path cannot converge to
zero (see Le Van and Dana, 2005) and hence is increasing. Since Sc < Ss, it
cannot converge to Ss and will pass over Sc at some date T . Thus for any
t > T , the economy will invest in education (see Proposition 1).
(c) When S > Sc, one can check that θ∗ = (1+γ−α)aS+(a
bS−1)α
aS(1+γ) . Using the
envelope theorem, we find
H ′(S) = (
α
1 + γ
)α(1 + γ − α)a1−α[1 + aθ∗S − aŜ)]γ−α [1 + aS − aŜ)]α
for any S > Sc. Then H ′(S) ≥ ( α1+γ )α(1 + γ − α)a1−α, since θ∗ ≤ 1 and
θ∗S − Ŝ > 0. If the optimal sequence {S∗t } which is increasing, converges to a
steady state S¯ then H ′(S¯) = 1β . But when a converges to +∞, H ′(S¯) goes also
to infinity: a contradiction. Hence, the optimal sequence {S∗t } will converge to
+∞ when a is large enough.
(d) Since H ′(S) ≥ ( α1+γ )α(1 + γ − α)a1−α, H ′(S) converges to infinity if γ
does too. Apply the argument in (c).
Remark 2 Observe that if 1 − aŜ > 0 then θ∗ is an increasing function of
S. In the long term, θ∗ will converge to (1+γ−α)(1+γ) which is larger than the share
devoted to physical capital 1− θ∗ = α1+γ if 2α < 1 + γ. This condition must be
satisfied with empirical data because usually α is around 13 .
4 To Fight the Corruption and Economic Growth
In this section we suppose the country wants to fight the corruption. The
expenses for this task is S2. We have the budget constraint k + S1 + S2 = S.
We assume that the threshold is described by the function Ŝ = Ψ(S, S2), where
Ψ is a decreasing function in S2 and in S (given S, the level of corruption
diminishes if we devote more S2; given S2, it decreases if the country is richer,
i.e. S is high). We assume that Ψ(S, .) is convex, Ψ(S, 0) > 0,Ψ(S,+∞) = 0,
the derivative with respect to S2, Ψ2(S, S2) is increasing in S. And finally,
Ψ2(S, 0) < −1, given σ > 0,limS→+∞Ψ2(S, σ) > −1 (such a function exists,
e.g., Ψ(S, σ) = 1S+σµ+1 , 0 < µ < 1).
Let ΦS(S1, S2) be defined as follows:
ΦS(S1, S2) = 1, if S1 ≤ Ψ(S, S2), and
ΦS(S1, S2) = 1 + a(S1 −Ψ(S, S2)), if S1 ≥ Ψ(S, S2).
Let ∆ = {(x, y) ≥ 0 : x + y ≤ 1}. Given S, S1, S2 with S1 + S2 ≤ S, define
(θ1, θ2) ∈ ∆ by S1 = θ1S, , S2 = θ2S. Our problem is to find θ1(S), θ2(S) which
maximize (1− θ1 − θ2)αΦS(θ1S, θ2S)1+γ−α, under the constraint (θ1, θ2) ∈ ∆.
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Lemma 3 There exists Sc such that
S < Sc ⇒ θ1(S) = θ2(S) = 0,
S > Sc ⇒ θ1(S) > 0, θ2(S) > 0.
Proof : The function S → Ψ(S, S) decreases from Ψ(0, 0) to 0 when S goes
from 0 to +∞. Let S be the unique solution to S = Ψ(S, S). We claim that
S < S implies θ1(S) = θ2(S) = 0. Indeed, if S < S, then
Ψ(S, θ2S) ≥ Ψ(S, S) > S ≥ θ1S and ΦS(θ1S, θ2S) = 1.
The optimal values θ1(S), θ2(S) must equal 0.
Now, fix (θ˜
1
, θ˜
2
) in the interior of ∆. Let S˜1 = θ˜
1
S, S˜2 = θ˜
2
S. Then ΦS(S˜1, S˜2)
converges to +∞ when S converges to +∞. Hence
max
(θ1,θ2)∈∆
(1− θ1 − θ2)αΦS(θ˜1S, θ˜2S)1+γ−α ≥ (1− θ˜1 − θ˜2)αΦS(S˜1, S˜2)1+γ−α > 1
for any S large enough. This excludes θ1(S) = 0.
Let
Γ(S) = max
(θ1,θ2)∈∆
(1− θ1 − θ2)αΦS(θ1S, θ2S)1+γ−α
and
S∗ = sup{S : S < S ⇒ Γ(S) = 1},
S∗ = inf{S¯ : S ≥ S¯ ⇒ Γ(S) > 1}.
One can check that S∗ = S∗. Take Sc = S∗ = S∗.
We now prove that θ2(S) > 0 if S > Sc. For short, write θ1, θ2 instead
of θ1(S), θ2(S). If θ2 = 0, we the have the following First-Order Conditions
(FOC):
(1 + γ − α)aS
1 + a(θ1S − S˜) −
α
1− θ1 = 0
−(1 + γ − α)aSΨ2(S, 0)
1 + a(θ1S − S˜) −
α
1− θ1 ≤ 0.
This implies Ψ2(S, 0) ≥ −1: a contradiction with our assumptions. Hence
θ2 > 0.
Lemma 4 Let S > Sc. The optimal value for S2 is given by the equation
Ψ2(S, S2) = −1. It is an increasing function in S. The optimal values for k
and S1 are also increasing functions in S. When S goes to infinity, S2(S) goes
to infinity too and hence Ŝ goes to zero, where S2(S) denotes the optimal value
for S2, given S.
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Proof : The FOC conditions will be:
(1 + γ − α)aS
1 + a(θ1S −Ψ2(S, θ2S))
− α
1− θ1 − θ2 = 0
−(1 + γ − α)aSΨ2(S, θ
2S)
1 + a(θ1S −Ψ2(S, θ2S))
− α
1− θ1 − θ2 = 0.
This implies Ψ2(S, θ2S) = −1, i.e. Ψ2(S, S2(S)) = −1. It is easy to check that
the optimal value S2(S) increases with S. The optimal value k(S) is given by
the problem maxk{kα[Φ(ζ(S) − k]1+γ−α} under the constraint 0 ≤ k ≤ ζ(S),
with ζ(S) = S − S2(S) − Ψ(S, S2(S)) which is increasing in S. In view of the
form of the function Φ, one can check that the function {kα[Φ(ζ(S)−k]1+γ−α is
supermodular in k, S. Using an argument in Amir (1996), we obtain that k(S)
is increasing in S (k(S) denotes the optimal value of k. We let to the reader
check that the optimal value S1(S) is also increasing in S.
We now prove that the optimal value S2(S) converges to +∞ when S converges
to infinity. Indeed, if it is not the case, since S2(S) is increasing in S, we can
suppose that it converges to some S¯ < +∞. Since Ψ2(S, S2(S)) = −1 for
any S, if ε > 0 is small enough, we obtain limS→+∞Ψ2(S, S¯ − ε) ≤ −1 which
contradicts the assumption that limS→+∞Ψ2(S, σ) > −1 for any σ > 0.
Let L(S) = maxk,S1,S2{kα[1+Φ(S1)]1+γ−α} under the constraints k+S1+
S2 = S and Ŝ = Ψ(S, S2). L(S) is the maximum output obtained from S. The
optimal growth model is:
max
+∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct)
under the constraint : for any period t, ct + St+1 ≤ L(St), and S0 > 0 is given.
We can define as in Section 2 the critical value Sc as
Sc = max{S : L(S)Sα}.
Let us recall Ss which is defined in Section 2: α(Ss)α−1 = 1β . We now give the
main result of this section
Proposition 4 Assume Sc < Ss and γ > α. If either a or γ is high enough
then the optimal S∗t (which is increasing) will converge to infinity and the thresh-
old Ŝ converges to zero (the corruption disappears in the long term.
Proof : As in Proposition 3 (b), the optimal path is increasing since Sc < Ss.
Computing the derivative of the function L, one can show, as in Proposition
3 (d), that L′(S) is uniformly bounded from below by a quantity which con-
verges to +∞ if either a or γ converges to infinity too. Therefore, when these
parameters are high enough, the optimal path {S∗t } converges to infinity. In
particular, the optimal sequence {S2∗t } converges also to infinity and hence Ŝ
goes to zero (see Lemma 4).
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5 Empirical Evidence
The data are provided in Xavier Sala-i-Martin, Gernot Doppelhofer, and Ronald
I. Miller (2004). They examine the robustness of a wide range of 67 explana-
tory variables in cross-country economic growth regressions. We take a basic
specification where average growth rate of GDP per capita between 1960 and
1996 is explained by the most robust explanatory variables according to their
analysis, that is the relative price of investment iprice1, the logarithm of the
initial level of real GDP per capita gdpch60l, and primary school enrolment p60.
A alternative specification is the same growth equation with public education
spending share in GDP in 1960s geerec1 replacing primary school enrolment
p60. For testing the implication of the model, namely that the return of the
investment in education can be cancelled by corruption up to a critical size, we
interact primary school enrolment p60 and public education spending geerec1
with corruption or with the following governance indicators (see Kaufman et
alii ) for the year 1996:
• Va96 : Voice and Accountability - measuring political, civil and human
rights;
• Pol96 : Political Instability and Violence - measuring the likelihood of
violent threats to, or changes in, government, including terrorism;
• Gov96 : Government Effectiveness - measuring the competence of the bu-
reaucracy and the quality of public service delivery;
• Reg96 : Regulatory Burden - measuring the incidence of market-unfriendly
policies;
• Rul96 : Rule of Law - measuring the quality of contract enforcement, the
police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence;
• Corr96 : Control of Corruption - measuring the exercise of public power
for private gain, including both petty and grand corruption and state
capture.
gr6095i = b1+ b2 iprice1i+ b3 p60i+ b4 (p60 ∗ inst96)i+ b5 gdpch60li+ εi (4)
gr6095i = b1+b2 iprice1i+b3 geerec1i+b4 (geerec1∗inst96)i+b5 gdpch60li+εi
(5)
The value of each indicator2 varies from -2.5 to 2.5, an higher value indicating
a better institutional situation. Corruption has many definitions, which can be
related to those indicators. According to Ritva Reinikka and Jakob Svensson
2As explained in Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2004)
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(2005), corruption is defined as the lack of information and transparency in
delivering education services. The lack of information and transparency can
be proxied by the quality of the service delivered (Gov96 ) and the quality of
contract enforcement (Rul96 ). De la Croix and Delavallade (2006) emphasize
how corruption can distort the composition of public spending, by favoring sec-
tors where rent seeking can be achieved more easily. Government effectiveness
(Gov96 ) and regulatory burden (Reg96 ) can be used for measuring the extent
of this distorsion due to rent seeking and corruption. Our own definition of
corruption in the previous section is the negative externality on growth, which
can be explained either by the variable control of corruption (Corr96 ) or by any
dimension of public and private governance in the educational system, likely to
lower the quality in delivering education services.
As can be seen from the interacted variables in tables 4 to 9, and tables
10 to 15, good institutions enhance growth by increasing the positive return
to education (public spending on education or primary schooling). Table 1 re-
ports the increase in the average rate of growth induced by an improvement
in the institutional variable from its average value to the average value plus
twice the standard error. All variables are taken at their mean value. Figures
in the first (second) column are calculated using coefficients from equation 4
(respectively equation 5). Finally tables 2 and 3 provide cross countries com-
parisons. What would have been growth in country x if the quality of a given
institution had augmented by the average value plus twice the standard error,
and in which developed country y do we observe the rate of growth implied by
such an institutional improvement?
According to Tables 1 and 2, column A, an improvement in the Voice and
Accountability variable implies an increase in the rate of growth from 1,58% -
which is the rate of growth of Nepal, where the score of Voice and Accountability
is relatively low (0,14) - to 2,23%, which is close to the rate of growth of Canada
and that of the United States, where the scores of Voice and Accountability
reflect an higher level of political, human and civil rights (respectively 1,44 and
1,53). The implied increase in growth 0,65% would have allowed Senegal to get
a non-negative rate of growth. Table 1, column B, tells that an improvement
in Political Instability and Violence induces an increase in growth from 1,58%
(Nepal) to 2,55% (West Germany). In Nepal Political Instability is -0,35, in
West Germany the score stands at 1,31. The economy of Liberia, which declined
over the period at -0.87%, would have stagnated.
A better control of corruption doubles the rate of growth via a better return
to education, from 1,56% to 2,92% according to equation 4 (column A in Table 1
), and 3,56% to 4,82% according to equation 5 (column B in Table 1). Efficiently
fighting against corruption would have allowed Ecuador to reach the same rate
of growth as Austria (Table 2 ), and Greece or Spain to reach the same rate of
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growth as Japan.
Table 1: Impact of Institutions on Growth corresponding growth computed with
4:(column A) corresponding growth computed with 5: (column B)
Institution Colunm A Colunm B
Voice and Accountability
average value 1,58% 1,75%
average value plus twice the standard error 2,23% 1,75%
implied increase in growth 0,65% 0,00%
Political Instability and Violence
average value 1,55% 1,58%
average value plus twice the standard error 2,60% 2,55%
implied increase in growth 1,05% 0,97%
Government Effectiveness
average value 1,42% 1,13%
average value plus twice the standard error 3,02% 2,77%
implied increase in growth 1,60% 1,64%
Regulatory Burden
average value 1,44% 3,46%
average value plus twice the standard error 2,87% 4,91%
implied increase in growth 1,43% 1,45%
Rule of Law
average value 1,47% 1,04%
average value plus twice the standard error 3,01% 2,60%
implied increase in growth 1,54% 1,56%
Control of Corruption
average value 1,56% 3,56%
average value plus twice the standard error 2,92% 4,82%
implied increase in growth 1,36% 1,26%
The next step of this empirical study is to instrument the institutional vari-
ables for addressing the double causality running from institutions to growth
and vice et versa. Variables such as the share of Protestants and former British
colonies identified by Treisman (2000) are used as instruments. We use as well
other variables correlated with the endogeneous explanatory variable but not
with the residual of the equation, like the degree of ethnolinguistic fractional-
ization, fraction buddhist, fraction catholic, landlockness, oil producing country
dummy, the extent of political rights, the share of primary exports in 1970. The
results are mixed, while the coefficients of either public education spending or
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Table 2: Impact of Institutions on Growth: Cross countries Comparisons
COUNTRY GR6096 VA96 Pol96 Gov96 Reg96 Rul96 Corr96
Ecuador 1,54% 0,06 -0,61 -0,65 -0,05 -0,39 -0,75
Nepal 1,58% 0,14 -0,35 -0,38 -0,22 -0,36 -0,28
Canada 2,21% 1,44 1,02 1,92 1,37 1,87 2,14
United States 2,27% 1,53 1,06 2,02 1,56 1,79 1,71
Senegal -0,67% -0,17 -0,67 -0,40 -0,45 -0,17 -0,39
Ecuador 1,54% 0,06 -0,61 -0,65 -0,05 -0,39 -0,75
France 2,63% 1,50 1,03 1,75 1,18 1,65 1,39
Liberia -1,01% -1,40 -2,42 -2,19 -2,91 -2,15 -1,66
Jordan 1,40% -0,16 0,40 0,18 0,06 0,20 -0,10
Israel 3,03% 1,07 -0,50 1,32 1,24 1,18 1,48
Madagascar -1,61% 0,26 0,23 -0,64 -0,07 -0,85 0,37
Angola -1,51% -1,42 -2,17 -1,13 -1,60 -1,44 -1,00
Uganda 1,37% -0,63 -1,19 -0,37 0,10 -0,88 -0,52
Austria 2,89% 1,43 1,38 1,92 1,51 1,98 1,66
Congo 1,51% -1,23 -0,70 -1,24 -0,70 -1,27 -0,81
Israel 3,03% 1,07 -0,50 1,32 1,24 1,18 1,48
Angola -1,51% -1,42 -2,17 -1,13 -1,60 -1,44 -1,00
Ecuador 1,54% 0,06 -0,61 -0,65 -0,05 -0,39 -0,75
Austria 2,89% 1,43 1,38 1,92 1,51 1,98 1,66
Angola -1,51% -1,42 -2,17 -1,13 -1,60 -1,44 -1,00
Note: Growth rates of countries selected according to the corresponding figures in Table 1 column 1.
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Table 3: Impact of Institutions on Growth: Cross countries Comparisons
COUNTRY GR6096 VA96 Pol96 Gov96 Reg96 Rul96 Corr96
Nepal 1,58% 0,14 -0,35 -0,38 -0,22 -0,36 -0,28
Germany, West 2,57% 1,55 1,31 1,91 1,54 1,90 1,76
Liberia -1,01% -1,40 -2,42 -2,19 -2,91 -2,15 -1,66
Haiti -0,87% -0,46 -0,21 -1,42 -1,23 -1,23 -0,98
Bangladesh 1,10% -0,33 -0,53 -0,67 -0,54 -0,68 -0,47
Jamaica 1,13% 0,55 0,64 -0,41 0,54 -0,21 -0,33
Finland 2,72% 1,71 1,45 1,89 1,50 2,08 2,23
Madagascar -1,61% 0,26 0,23 -0,64 -0,07 -0,85 0,37
Tunisia 3,28% -0,53 0,24 0,49 0,05 0,07 -0,05
Japan 4,67% 1,08 1,08 1,36 0,84 1,60 1,22
Angola -1,51% -1,42 -2,17 -1,13 -1,60 -1,44 -1,00
Argentina 1,02% 0,60 0,47 0,45 0,82 0,28 -0,12
Costa Rica 1,02% 1,37 0,89 0,16 0,68 0,64 0,76
Sierra Leone 1,02% -1,37 -2,25 -0,24 -0,45 -1,02 -1,66
Kenya 1,06% -0,48 -0,38 -0,60 -0,48 -0,77 -1,05
France 2,63% 1,50 1,03 1,75 1,18 1,65 1,39
Madagascar -1,61% 0,26 0,23 -0,64 -0,07 -0,85 0,37
Angola -1,51% -1,42 -2,17 -1,13 -1,60 -1,44 -1,00
Greece 3,43% 0,98 0,42 0,76 0,80 0,78 0,37
Spain 3,55% 1,15 0,64 1,59 1,16 1,23 0,77
Japan 4,67% 1,08 1,08 1,36 0,84 1,60 1,22
Nicaragua -1,14% -0,22 -0,66 -0,46 -0,21 -0,68 -0,15
Note: Growth rates of countries selected according to the corresponding figures in Table 1 column 2.
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primary schooling in 1960 are no more significant, institutions interacted with
education still matter. More importantly, the Hausman tests do not reject the
null hypothesis telling that institutions are exogeneous3 . Therefore we rest on
the previous results.
6 Conclusion
This paper provides an endogeneous optimal growth model for explaining the
impact of corruption within the education sector. Human capital is produced
through a non-linear education technology. The non-linearity is due to a fixed
cost, above which investment in education yields a positive return. Below the
threshold, investment in human capital does not produce any return. While a
great deal of models emphasizes the consequences of corruption and more gen-
erally of low quality institutions on total factor productivity, our model focuses
on the effect of corruption on the return to education. Its implication is tested
using the dataset collected by Xavier Sala-i-Martin, Gernot Doppelhofer, and
Ronald I. Miller (2004). Empirical analysis supports the idea that corruption
decreases the return to education.
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Table 4: Growth, Education,Voice and Accountability
gr6096 Coefficient Std Err T-Stat P> |t|
iprice1 -0,0000992 0,0000341 -2,91 0,004
p60 0,0353232 0,0081749 4,32 0
p60*va96 0,004709 0,0027339 1,72 0,088
gdpch60l -0,0063468 0,0037929 -1,67 0,097
cons 0,0469749 0,0243959 1,93 0,057
Table 5: Growth, Education,Political Instability
gr6096 Coefficient Std Err T-Stat P> |t|
gr6096 Coefficient Std Err T-Stat P> |t|
iprice1 -0,0000943 0,0000327 -2,89 0,005
p60 0,0341149 0,0080684 4,23 0
p60*pol96 0,0073202 0,0021288 3,44 0,001
gdpch60l -0,0063931 0,0030804 -2,08 0,04
cons 0,0477959 0,019669 2,43 0,017
Table 6: Growth, Education,Government Effectiveness
gr6096 Coefficient Std Err T-Stat P> |t|
gr6096 Coefficient Std Err T-Stat P> |t|
iprice1 -0,0000814 0,0000316 -2,58 0,011
p60 0,0339602 0,008182 4,15 0
p60*gov96 0,0108602 0,0019763 5,5 0
gdpch60l -0,0107624 0,0035889 -3 0,003
cons 0,0764289 0,0225627 3,39 0,001
Table 7: Growth, Education,Regulatory Framework
gr6096 Coefficient Std Err T-Stat P> |t|
gr6096 Coefficient Std Err T-Stat P> |t|
iprice1 -0,0000763 0,0000314 -2,43 0,017
p60 0,0321337 0,0079129 4,06 0
p60*reg96 0,0105224 0,002637 3,99 0
gdpch60l -0,0082551 0,0032012 -2,58 0,011
cons 0,0590293 0,0201235 2,93 0,004
Table 8: Growth, Education,Rule of Law
gr6096 Coefficient Std Err T-Stat P> |t|
gr6096 Coefficient Std Err T-Stat P> |t|
iprice1 -0,0000853 0,000031 -2,76 0,007
p60 0,0352735 0,0083265 4,24 0
p60*rul96 0,0104869 0,0021306 4,92 0
gdpch60l -0,0104191 0,003617 -2,88 0,005
cons 0,0738549 0,0227306 3,25 0,002
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Table 9: Growth, Education,Corruption
gr6096 Coefficient Std Err T-Stat P> |t|
gr6096 Coefficient Std Err T-Stat P> |t|
iprice1 -0,0000969 0,0000347 -2,79 0,006
p60 0,037631 0,0103372 3,64 0
p60*cor96 0,009314 0,0022544 4,13 0
gdpch60l -0,0108246 0,0044067 -2,46 0,016
cons 0,0771738 0,0272839 2,83 0,006
Table 10: Growth, Education,Voice and Accountability
gr6096 Coefficient Std Err T-Stat P> |t|
iprice1 -0,0001292 0,0000292 -4,43 0
geerec1 0,3490316 0,1867135 1,87 0,064
geerec1*va96 0,1385323 0,1002374 1,38 0,17
gdpch60l -0,000103 0,0027416 -0,04 0,97
cons 0,0211327 0,021211 1 0,321
Table 11: Growth, Education,Political Instability
gr6096 Coefficient Std Err T-Stat P> |t|
iprice1 -0,0001257 0,0000288 -4,36 0
geerec1 0,3336531 0,1766379 1,89 0,062
geerec1*pol96 0,1899536 0,0653656 2,91 0,004
gdpch60l 0,0001036 0,001982 0,05 0,958
cons 0,0197635 0,0154056 1,28 0,202
Table 12: Growth, Education,Government Effectiveness
gr6096 Coefficient Std Err T-Stat P> |t|
iprice1 -0,000104 0,0000278 -3,74 0
geerec1 0,1816014 0,1690278 1,07 0,285
geerec1*gov96 0,3162868 0,074646 4,24 0
gdpch60l -0,0041113 0,0023364 -1,76 0,081
cons 0,0504734 0,0182065 2,77 0,007
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Table 13: Growth, Education,Regulatory Framework
gr6096 Coefficient Std Err T-Stat P> |t|
iprice1 -0,0001066 0,0000277 -3,86 0
geerec1 0,3006736 0,1621821 1,85 0,067
geerec1*reg96 0,301736 0,0693875 4,35 0
gdpch60l -0,0025102 0,0021683 -1,16 0,25
cons 0,0365615 0,0163639 2,23 0,028
Table 14: Growth, Education,Rule of Law
gr6096 Coefficient Std Err T-Stat P> |t|
iprice1 -0,0001181 0,0000247 -4,79 0
geerec1 0,2317087 0,1652191 1,4 0,164
geerec1*rul96 0,3022762 0,0723724 4,18 0
gdpch60l -0,0036263 0,0022362 -1,62 0,108
cons 0,0472594 0,0173093 2,73 0,007
Table 15: Growth, Education,Corruption
gr6096 Coefficient Std Err T-Stat P> |t|
iprice1 -0,0001201 0,0000308 -3,9 0
geerec1 0,2547736 0,2022274 1,26 0,211
geerec1*cor96 0,2449854 0,0845091 2,9 0,005
gdpch60l -0,0033518 0,0027593 -1,21 0,228
cons 0,0462569 0,0211743 2,18 0,031
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